ate that they have effectively engineered a constitutional coup concerning the status of the city of Kirkuk. They have secured the right for a programme of de-Arabisation and a referendum on the status of the city, which will give them control. According to the 2005 draft constitution a referendum must be held in Kirkuk before the end of this year and recently the national government has agreed a policy of repatriation of Arabs, with compensation. In turn, displaced Kurds will return to repossess Arab hKirkuk and the Kurdish borderlands - Iraq’s “Bosnia.”

The Kurdish autonomous north has long been held out as an example of peace and security for the rest of Iraq. Today, however, it threatens to become a source of its greatest instability and an issue, which might tear Iraq apart. In particular, the question of the status of the mixed city of Kirkuk threatens to ignite civil war tensions that will reverberate throughout the country and possibly threaten the intervention of outside powers, especially Turkey.

Kirkuk is a mixed city, with a predominantly Kurdish population, on the southern edge but outside of the autonomous federal Kurdish governate. For the Kurds, Kirkuk is a highly emotive issue. They consider it a city for which they have struggled and sacrificed their blood and livelihoods at the cost of forced depopulation, Arabisation and genocide. The infamous chemical attacks at Anfal in 1988 were in villages around Kirkuk. Nevertheless, the Kurds remain the largest community and they are determined to incorporate Kirkuk into the Kurdish federal governate as its capital.

The most ancient peoples who can claim the right to the city and region of Kirkuk are not the Kurds but the Christians. However, they are such a tiny minority that they are not a feasible ruling group. Following them come the Kurds and then the Turkomans, who were mostly settled by the Ottoman Empire, After them there are the nomadic and indigenous Arabs tribes and, finally, there are the recent Arabs, who were settled (sometimes compulsorily) by Saddam Hussein’s policy of “Arabisation” aimed at weakening Kurdish influence and power in the region. The Kurds argue that Kirkuk is essentially Kurdish and they want it as their capital, though they recognize the rights and existence of the Turkoman and Christian minorities. The Arabs, they say, should be repatriated (with financial) compensation, so that Kirkuk can become a fully Kurdish city again.

Indeed, such is the Kurds’ power within the weak Iraqi state that they have effectively engineered a constitutional coup concerning the status of the city of Kirkuk. They have secured the right for a programme of de-Arabisation and a referendum on the status of the city, which will give them control. According to the 2005 draft constitution a referendum must be held in Kirkuk before the end of this year and recently the national government has agreed a policy of repatriation of Arabs, with compensation. In turn, displaced Kurds will return to repossess Arab ho

lly Turkey.

Kirkuk is a mixed city, with a predominantly Kurdish population, on the southern edge but outside of the autonomous federal Kurdish governate. For the Kurds, Kirkuk is a highly emotive issue. They consider it a city for which they have struggled and sacrificed their blood and livelihoods at the cost of forced depopulation, Arabisation and genocide. The infamous chemical attacks at Anfal in 1988 were in villages around Kirkuk. Nevertheless, the Kurds remain the largest community and they are determined to incorporate Kirkuk into the Kurdish federal governate as its capital.

The most ancient peoples who can claim the right to the city and region of Kirkuk are not the Kurds but the Christians. However, they are such a tiny minority that they are not a feasible ruling group. Following them come the Kurds and then the Turkomans, who were mostly settled by the Ottoman Empire, After them there are the nomadic and indigenous Arabs tribes and, finally, there are the recent Arabs, who were settled (sometimes compulsorily) by Saddam Hussein’s policy of “Arabisation” aimed at weakening Kurdish influence and power in the region. The Kurds argue that Kirkuk is essentially Kurdish and they want it as their capital, though they recognize the rights and existence of the Turkoman and Christian minorities. The Arabs, they say, should be repatriated (with financial) compensation, so that Kirkuk can become a fully Kurdish city again.

Indeed, such is the Kurds’ power within the weak Iraqi state that they have effectively engineered a constitutional coup concerning the status of the city of Kirkuk. They have secured the right for a programme of de-Arabisation and a referendum on the status of the city, which will give them control. According to the 2005 draft constitution a referendum must be held in Kirkuk before the end of this year and recently the national government has agreed a policy of repatriation of Arabs, with compensation. In turn, displaced Kurds will return to repossess Arab h

y are determined to incorporate Kirkuk into the Kurdish federal governate as its capital.

The most ancient peoples who can claim the right to the city and region of Kirkuk are not the Kurds but the Christians. However, they are such a tiny minority that they are not a feasible ruling group. Following them come the Kurds and then the Turkomans, who were mostly settled by the Ottoman Empire, After them there are the nomadic and indigenous Arabs tribes and, finally, there are the recent Arabs, who were settled (sometimes compulsorily) by Saddam Hussein’s policy of “Arabisation” aimed at weakening Kurdish influence and power in the region. The Kurds argue that Kirkuk is essentially Kurdish and they want it as their capital, though they recognize the rights and existence of the Turkoman and Christian minorities. The Arabs, they say, should be repatriated (with financial) compensation, so that Kirkuk can become a fully Kurdish city again.

Indeed, such is the Kurds’ power within the weak Iraqi state that they have effectively engineered a constitutional coup concerning the status of the city of Kirkuk. They have secured the right for a programme of de-Arabisation and a referendum on the status of the city, which will give them control. According to the 2005 draft constitution a referendum must be held in Kirkuk before the end of this year and recently the national government has agreed a policy of repatriation of Arabs, with compensation. In turn, displaced Kurds will return to repossess Arab h

re settled (sometimes compulsorily) by Saddam Hussein’s policy of “Arabisation” aimed at weakening Kurdish influence and power in the region. The Kurds argue that Kirkuk is essentially Kurdish and they want it as their capital, though they recognize the rights and existence of the Turkoman and Christian minorities. The Arabs, they say, should be repatriated (with financial) compensation, so that Kirkuk can become a fully Kurdish city again.

Indeed, such is the Kurds’ power within the weak Iraqi state that they have effectively engineered a constitutional coup concerning the status of the city of Kirkuk. They have secured the right for a programme of de-Arabisation and a referendum on the status of the city, which will give them control. According to the 2005 draft constitution a referendum must be held in Kirkuk before the end of this year and recently the national government has agreed a policy of repatriation of Arabs, with compensation. In turn, displaced Kurds will return to repossess Arab h

ate that they have effectively engineered a constitutional coup concerning the status of the city of Kirkuk. They have secured the right for a programme of de-Arabisation and a referendum on the status of the city, which will give them control. According to the 2005 draft constitution a referendum must be held in Kirkuk before the end of this year and recently the national government has agreed a policy of repatriation of Arabs, with compensation. In turn, displaced Kurds will return to repossess Arab homes and businesses, something which is already happening under the local Kurdish council. This is bringing ethnic tensions to a boiling point. Arabs have already demonstrated on the streets refusing to be deported or “ethnically cleansed” and saying they have nowhere to go and intend to stay and fight for Kirkuk.

What makes this doubly contentious is the huge oil and gas reserves, which Kirkuk sits on. These would make the Kurdish autonomous region a viable independent state, which could mean the break up of Iraq. It also sends shudders down the spine of Iraq’s neighbours, because they fear it could become a powerful magnet for their own substantial Kurdish populations to break away and seek union with Kurdish Iraq. These include Iran, Syria and most of all Turkey, who has seriously threatened military intervention, should Kirkuk formerly fall into Kurdish hands.

The other communities also vehemently dispute the Kurds’ claims and objectives. The Turkomans consider Kirkuk to be historically Turkoman. Indigenous and recent Arab settlers view Kirkuk as an integral part of Iraq, to which they have every right to belong to and live in. Everyone views the Kurds claims suspiciously as driven by greed for the oil revenues.

The Arabs of the region fall into two segments or two with a sub-segment. There are indigenous Arab tribes, mostly in rural areas and the mostly urban “settler” Arabs who came mostly as part of the forced Arabisation of Saddam Hussein. Most are Shiites who came trying to escape poverty. and many claim to have fled victimization and forcible seizure of their own original lands further south. Sunnis also arrived and destroyed many Kurdish villages and build their own new ones. From the overall Arab viewpoint Kirkuk and other areas should never become part of Kurdistan, but should remain designated mixed areas as a mixed region under central government control or with a special federal status similar to other regions.

Such are the reports of the mood in Kirkuk that